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In 2016, the Federal Aviation Administration estimated that unmanned 
aircraft would balloon to more than 7 million units by 2020 (FAA, 2016).  A recent 
census of users in the FAA’s UAS Registration Database totaled 836,577 as of 
March 23, 2017, providing a rough barometer of domestic UAS market growth 
(Larls, 2017).   
 
Research Problem 
 
The recent proliferation of small, commercially-available UAS systems has 
resulted in a small but growing number of illicit activities involving this new 
technology.  Similarly, some UAS operations are taking place in proximity to 
airports, critical infrastructure, national security areas, and other locations, sparking 
security and safety concerns.  Such incidents have ignited the growth of counter-
UAS businesses focused on keeping unmanned aircraft away from sensitive areas 
and responding to unmanned aerial threats.   
 
An Emerging Threat 
 
At prisons throughout the United States, UAS platforms are being used to 
illegally deliver illicit contraband to inmates inside.  As early as 2013, Georgia law 
enforcement personnel arrested four individuals who were planning to use an 
unmanned aircraft to smuggle tobacco and cellular phones into a state prison (Craig, 
Susso, & Shaffer, 2016).  In 2015, officials in Ohio recorded three UAS incidents 
at correctional facilities, all involving the delivery of narcotics (Craig, Susso, & 
Shaffer, 2016). Similarly, Oklahoma correctional facilities recovered a crashed 
UAS inside a state prison carrying hacksaw blades, cellular phone equipment, and 
narcotics (Craig, Susso, & Shaffer, 2016).  Department of Justice records obtained 
by USA Today indicated more than a dozen documented incidents of drone 
operators attempting to deliver contraband to U.S. prisons during an unreported 
period (Abbasi, 2017).   
 
A UAS was even suspected to have aided the escape of South Carolina 
inmate, Jimmy Causey.  South Carolina Department of Correction Director Bryan 
Stirling, stated, “We also potentially believe that a drone was used to help him 
[Causey] get the contraband in to escape” (Bolster & Rivera, 2017, p. 1).  
According to Justin Long, a spokesman for the Bureau of Prisons, “The threat posed 
by drones to induce contraband into prison and other means is increasing.” 
(Rattigan, 2017, p. 1). 
 
 Border patrol and drug enforcement personnel have identified drones are 
being used to facilitate narcotics smuggling over the U.S.-Mexican border. In 2015, 
1
Wallace et al.: Exploring Commercial Counter-UAS Operations: A Case Study
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018
  
 
   
an unmanned aircraft carrying 6 pounds of crystal meth crashed in the border town 
of Tijuana, apparently overloaded from its illicit cargo (Valencia & Martinez, 
2015). According to Tijuana police, the drone used GPS to send the craft to a 
particular, unnamed destination (Valencia & Martinez, 2015).  It is estimated that 
the cartels have used unmanned aircraft to smuggle narcotics at least 150 times per 
year (Shields, 2017).  Dinan (2018) highlighted the increasing frequency of 
unmanned aircraft smuggling, noting a four-day period in November 2017 in which 
border agents documented 13 separate incidents of drug-laden UAS crossings over 
one section of the U.S.-Mexico border.  In addition to suspected smuggling, drug 
enforcement expert Sylvia Longmire stated, “the cartels have been using drones for 
surveillance”—likely to monitor and circumvent law enforcement activities 
(Valencia & Martinez, 2015, p. 1).  
 
 In addition to illicit activities, some UAS operations also create a public 
hazard.  The FAA has shown an interest in counter-UAS technology due to an 
increasing number of unauthorized UAS operations being conducted in dangerous 
proximity to airports.  Using data collected between December 17, 2013, through 
September 12, 2015, a study of UAS close encounters with manned aircraft 
revealed that 58.8% of the 665 reported incidents containing distance data occurred 
within 5 miles of an airport (Gettinger & Michel, 2015).  An updated report 
evaluating data from August 21, 2015, to January 31, 2016, revealed that 58.8% of 
reported incidents containing distance data – the identical proportion from the 
earlier study – occurred within 5 miles of an airport (Michel & Gettinger, 2016).  
Unmanned aircraft are generally restricted from operating within 5 miles of an 
airport without providing notification to the airport operator for recreational 
operations conducted under 14 CFR 101 Subpart E, or without a 14 CFR 107.41 
waiver for commercial UAS operations if the airport falls within airspace 
categorized as B, C, D, or [surface class] E (Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 2016; 
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 2016).   In 2016, the Federal Aviation 
Administration was directed by Congress via Public Law 114-190, to “establish a 
pilot program for airspace hazard mitigation at airports and other critical 
infrastructure using unmanned aircraft detection systems” (FAA Extension Safety 
& Security Act of 2016, Sec. 2206).  The agency subsequently partnered with 
Nevada Institute for Autonomous Systems, Northern Plains Test Site, and Denver 
International Airport to evaluate technologies for detecting intruding UAS 
platforms operating near airports (Carey, 2016). 
 
 The full potential of UAS threats is still not fully understood and is an area 
of emerging research.  Wallace and Loffi (2015) attempt to codify a generic 
taxonomy of currently known UAS threat categories.  Just as new legitimate UAS 
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applications are continuing to be explored, so too are illegitimate uses of unmanned 
technology.         
 
Counter UAS Overview 
 
 Counter-UAS technology can be facilitated using a wide variety of means, 
but focuses on two distinct processes: detection and engagement.  Detection 
encompasses technology and processes necessary to detect, locate, track, and 
identify an unmanned aircraft.  Conversely, engagement involves technology and 
actions to prevent, disrupt, disable, override, spoof [mislead], or otherwise interfere 
with UAS operations. Engagement may also include active measures to forcefully 
capture, inflict damage, or destroy the aerial vehicle. The distinction between these 
processes is essential, as there are no legal ramifications for conducting UAS 
detection, whereas significant legal hurdles exist to conducting engagement 
(Rupprecht, 2017). 
 
Existing Counter-UAS Restrictions 
 
 There are several legal impediments to utilizing counter-UAS technology. 
The Communications Act of 1934 prohibits the use of unlicensed radio equipment 
such as jammers or other devices that interfere with communication, such as the 
UAS command link (Rupprecht, 2017).  It is further prohibited to manufacture, 
import, market, sell or operate jamming equipment in the U.S. under 47 CFR 2.803 
(Rupprecht, 2017).  Finally, 18 USC section 32 imposes imprisonment or fines 
upon those that damage, disable, or destroy civil aircraft (Rupprecht, 2017).  
Operators may also be subject to liability associated with tort claims arising from 
the potential collateral damage, injury, or adverse effects of counter UAS activities 
(Rupprecht, 2017).  Such liability issues may include interference caused by 
jamming equipment or damage or injury caused by the forced disabling of the 
offending unmanned aircraft. 
 
Easing Counter-UAS Restrictions  
 
 As errant UAS operations continue relatively unabated, Congress has taken 
notice.  In 2016, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017.  
In Sec. 1697, Congress codified new authority for military leaders to mitigate UAS 
threats.  The statute gave relatively broad powers for the armed forces to disrupt 
control, intercept, seize, disable, damage, and destroy offending aircraft 
(Rupprecht, 2017; National Defense Authorization Act of 2017).   
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Rise of Commercial Counter-UAS 
 
 The security risk posed by unmanned aircraft has not gone unnoticed by 
commercial entities either.  Stadiums and other open-air public gatherings are 
recognizing the need for counter-UAS activities.  On November 28, 2017, Tracy 
Mapes was arrested after flying a small UAS over NFL game at both the Levi 
Stadium and Oakland Coliseum two days earlier (Gomez & Salonga, 2017).  The 
unmanned aircraft allegedly dropped leaflets over the stands at Levi Stadium. After 
reviewing surveillance footage of the initial incident, law enforcement personnel 
anticipated the alleged perpetrator would try the same activity at the nearby 
Oakland Coliseum.  Santa Clara Police Lt. Dan Moreno highlighted the risk of UAS 
operations over the crowded areas stating, "A drone can lose control and injure 
someone in the crowd or drop material that may be harmful. We are evaluating our 
security practices with state and federal authorities to make sure this doesn't happen 
again." (Gomez & Salonga, 2017, p. 1). 
 
Purpose 
 
 While information is available about countermeasure technology, very little 
information exists about the methods used to conduct counter-UAS operations.  The 
purpose of this study is to develop a better understanding of countermeasure tactics, 
techniques, procedures, and lessons learned. 
 
Research Objectives 
 
 Researchers sought to discover information to fulfill the following research 
objectives: 
 
1. Describe counter-UAS mission planning considerations. 
2. Identify key tasks associated with a counter-UAS engagement. 
3. Identify problems, unanticipated conditions, or lessons learned 
associated with counter-UAS operations. 
 
Method 
 
 The authors employed an exploratory research approach with a critical 
paradigm.  According to Creswell and Miller (2000), the critical paradigm “holds 
that researchers should uncover the hidden assumptions about how narrative 
accounts are constructed, read, and interpreted.” (p. 126).  
 
4
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 5 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol5/iss2/8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2018.1224
  
 
   
Authors interviewed a commercial, counter-UAS organization highlighting 
a specific, past counter-UAS event.  An unstructured interview was used to generate 
qualitative, descriptive data to address the research objectives.  While the majority 
of the interview was conducted using open-ended questions, the interviewer 
periodically asked targeted, clarifying questions to ensure accuracy and conceptual 
understanding.   
 
By qualitative procedures recommended by Creswell and Miller (2000), the 
authors utilized researcher reflexivity, collaboration, and peer debriefing to 
maintain study validity.  Researcher reflexivity involves the self-disclosure of 
personal assumptions and biases.  Further, the authors closely collaborated with 
participants as co-researchers when constructing the narratives and perspectives to 
ensure the accuracy.  Additionally, the author's employed member checking to 
validate complex or technical information. According to Creswell and Miller 
(2000), member checking involves “taking data and interpretations back to the 
participants in the study so they can confirm the credibility of the information and 
narrative account” (p. 127). Finally, the authors sought the peer review of several 
UAS and security experts to assess study methodology, assumptions, and data 
interpretation. 
 
Assumptions & Limitations 
 
 The following limitations and researcher assumptions applied to this 
project: 
 
1. Procedures utilized by counter-UAS organizations may vary widely, 
and the approach used by the interviewed organization was unlikely 
to be representative of all such organizations. 
2. The participants provided an accurate account of their experiences 
associated with the counter-UAS operation. 
3. Depending on the counter-UAS event locale, both UAS and counter-
UAS rules and regulations may not be universally applicable.   
4. The researcher was unable to record the interview due to proprietary 
and security concerns.  Instead, the interviewer took digital notes of 
key data points, which were assumed to be accurate. 
5. The researcher was required to sign a non-disclosure agreement with 
the participant organization, to withhold specific proprietary or 
security-sensitive data.  The participants agreed to provide a candid 
interview, which included discussion of specific unclassified, 
security-sensitive material to enhance researcher perspective.  The 
participants reviewed the paper before publication and were 
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permitted to strike proprietary or security-sensitive text. When 
applicable, the researcher replaced deleted security-sensitive text 
with generic descriptions of the type of information withheld. 
6. Technical details and specifications regarding detection and 
mitigation equipment were withheld for security and proprietary 
reasons.    
 
Researcher Reflexivity 
 
 The primary researcher was not a research subject.  The primary researcher 
does not have direct operational expertise with counter-UAS functions, however, 
has related military expertise in detection technologies.  The primary researcher is 
seasoned in performing qualitative research related to aviation security issues, 
including UAS security.  The researcher supports the use of counter-UAS means as 
a mechanism to deter, actively restrict, or mitigate unauthorized UAS operations 
that pose a security or safety hazard.  The primary researcher further supports the 
enforcement of UAS restrictions and regulations via means that include the 
interruption, damage, destruction or seizure of a UAS in exigent circumstances of 
compromised safety or security caused by the UAS operator. 
 
 The secondary researcher was not a research subject. The secondary 
researcher does not have operational expertise with counter-UAS functions, 
however, has ancillary experience as an advisor for counter-UAS research projects.  
The secondary researcher is also seasoned in performing qualitative research.  This 
researcher believes that counter-UAS is “much needed” and “woefully behind 
development.”  This researcher sees strong demand for counter-UAS activities to 
support border security, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism.  Further, this 
researcher advocates for counter-UAS employment for large stadiums, high 
population public events, domestic security, and select law enforcement functions.   
 
 The tertiary researchers simultaneously served as both research subjects and 
research collaborators.  These individuals have operational experience in 
performing counter-UAS functions in varied environments. The researchers 
actively participated in the FAA’s PATHFINDER program.  The PATHFINDER 
program is designed to facilitate “incremental expansion of UAS operations into 
the NAS” by focusing on visual line of sight over people, extended visual line of 
sight over rural areas, and beyond visual line of sight in rural or isolated areas 
(FAA, 2016, p. 1).  These researchers performed five counter-UAS demonstrations 
to various organizations, including the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast 
Guard, Secret Service, as well as a myriad of private companies.  Further, these 
researchers conducted two operational counter-UAS missions—one international 
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mission included UAS mitigation, with a second domestic mission limited to 
detection and reporting.  These researchers proactively support unmanned aircraft 
operations for a variety of practical functions, including security. Conversely, these 
researchers recognize the need for providing protection against unauthorized or 
hazardous UAS activities.  These researchers espouse the need for counter-UAS 
development as a basis for UAS detection system evolution and preservation of 
safety in the BVLOS environment.   
 
Results 
 
An interview was arranged with the CEO, Chief Security Officer, and Chief 
Pilot from Intelligent Drone Systems (IDS), a Florida-based company specializing 
in unmanned systems and counter-UAS technology. The interview focused on 
counter-UAS activities conducted in support of the Dominican Music Festival 
Presidente conducted from November 3-5, 2017 in the Felix Sanchez Olympic 
Stadium, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. 
 
Objective 
 
Intelligent Drone Systems was contracted to furnish a specific security 
detail to conduct 72 hours of UAS detection and counter-UAS services in support 
of the Festival Presidente beginning on November 3, 2017, at 0800L. IDS was 
explicitly charged with enforcing a UAS-free zone in proximity to the performance 
stage contained within the main stadium and surrounding area out to 1 km [specific 
contract details withheld].  Figure 1 displays an approximation of team’s operations 
area.  The IDS team maintained responsibility for identifying unauthorized UAS in 
proximity to the exclusion area, tracking UAS craft, locating offending UAS pilots, 
and engaging UAS craft violating the exclusion area.      
 
Planning 
 
 Pre-coordination was conducted with the Dominican Institute of Civil 
Aviation (IDAC), the Dominican Republic National Police, the Ministry of 
Defense, Cerveceria Nacional Dominicana (CND) [entertainment contractor], and 
event security service.    
 
 A site survey was conducted before the event to determine likely launch 
areas for possible intruding UAS platforms.  The survey included an overview of 
the surrounding topography.  The team determined that athletic fields immediately 
east of the stadium were most likely to be the launch site and ingress direction for 
unauthorized UAS flights. The team focused counter-UAS detection and 
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directional countermeasures to respond to threats primarily from that area.  High 
rise buildings to the west and north were determined to be unlikely ingress routes 
for UAS threats due to urban obstructions, the lack of open space to launch a UAS 
platform, and limited visual line of sight. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Felix Sanchez Olympic Stadium, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. IDS counter-UAS 
Area of Responsibility identified by red shading, extending 1 km from stadium. (Google 
Maps/Satellite Overlay) 
 
 
 Complicating the planning process, IDS was also required to coordinate and 
manage various UAS flights conducted by authorized vendors at the event.  IDS 
personnel coordinated with event planners to establish a white list of authorized 
UAS flights, and documented planned UAS operations via a generic flight plan. 
IDS was required to monitor and ensure authorized flights complied with their 
flight plans and were conducted safely.  IDS established takeoff and landing 
protocols for authorized flights, which required operators to pre-coordinate with 
IDS operators via a digital communications channel 30 minutes prior to scheduled 
launch, again just before takeoff, and immediately after landing.  Initially, two 
companies were authorized to fly unmanned aircraft during the event. 
 
The IDS team confirmed that IDAC had issued a Temporary Flight 
Restriction (TFR) for the event and coordinated with CND planners to post 
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numerous messages to UAS forums and social media sites advising UAS operators 
of flight restrictions surrounding the event and advising them to avoid the area.  
 
Deployment 
 
 IDS deployed three members to support this operation.  The detection and 
engagement system operator (DESO) led the IDS team from within the confines of 
the event operations center and coordinated with event operations staff.  A second 
team member was deployed at an elevated vantage point within the stadium as an 
overwatch observer to aid in UAS visual detection.  The third team member was a 
mobile liaison and deployed in conjunction with event security personnel to locate 
and make contact with unauthorized UAS operators.  
 
To aid in early UAS and UAS operator detection as well as enhance overall 
situational awareness, the IDS team was prepared to deploy a tethered, rotary-wing 
UAS to provide high-angle observation.  While procedures were in place to make 
use of tethered UAS information as needed, the team did not employ this device 
during the 72-hour mission execution period.  The team explained that the tethered 
UAS was not determined to be needed during the employment period. 
 
Communication 
 
The team utilized two primary communication mediums.  Voice 
communication was conducted using Zello, a push-to-talk (PTT) radio application 
designed for smartphones, tablets, and laptop computers.  The application requires 
internet connectivity, either via Wi-Fi or cellular phone network.  The application 
has a slight latency, with the voice message being delivered to the recipient after 
the sender releases the PTT button. The application also features user-defined 
channels, which can also be used to share photos, playback messages, and post to 
social media. 
 
Sharing of text information was performed via WhatsApp, a digital instant 
messaging service for VoIP, video calls, images, documents, media, and user 
location that can be used on a mobile phone or computer.  IDS established multiple 
WhatsApp channels for various functions, including authorized UAS operators, 
security operations channel for IDS personnel, and a master channel for liaising 
with event planners and security staff.    
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Counter-UAS Detection & Engagement System 
  
The team utilized multiple radio frequency (RF) detectors and control signal 
interruption devices operated from a laptop computer in the event operations center 
[device manufacturer and model withheld].  The RF detection system was designed 
to: identify the presence of UAS communication signal parametrics, triangulate the 
approximate position of the UAS, and automatically display detection information 
on the user interface.  The detection and engagement system operator could choose 
to monitor the UAS activity in real time or execute an electronic countermeasure 
that would override the communication links between the remote pilot and UAS. 
Depending on the UAS type and firmware, the link interruption would cause the 
UAS to return-to-home—its launch point--or immediately discontinue flight.  
  
In addition to responsive interruption as detailed above, the RF system 
allowed for the creation of a digital geofence restricted zone that could prevent 
unmanned aircraft from taking off, entering a defined area, or following the remote 
pilot’s instructions while inside the area. The effectiveness of the geofence zone 
was limited if the unauthorized UAS were not within initial line-of-sight of one of 
the four RF countermeasure system transmitters.  For this event, a geofence 
restricted zone was established within a 5 km radius of the stadium and up to 500ft 
AGL. Due to the potential risks of a UAS falling abruptly and causing injury or 
property damage, the geofence was configured for automatic-detection and 
notification only. Each countermeasure was employed manually, in coordination 
with security, overwatch and with prior authorization from the IDAC liaison or 
event Chief Security Officer.  
 
Four integrated detection sensors/interruption transmitters were initially 
planned for deployment, one in each of four cardinal directions from the stadium.  
One detector was damaged prior to mission execution due to intermittent power 
availability.  As a result, the team was forced to remove sensor coverage from the 
southern sector.    
 
The RF system was the only active UAS countermeasure system used 
during the mission.  The IDS team did not plan to utilize any form of kinetic 
engagement to disable unmanned aircraft in the event the RF countermeasure 
system was ineffective.  In the unlikely event, the countermeasure system was 
ineffective at disabling an unauthorized UAS, the IDS team would report 
information about the offending UAS and defer action to the event’s Chief Security 
Officer and IDAC liaison.  
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Engagement Cycle 
 
 IDS personnel established an identification matrix to determine the identity, 
location, status, and disposition of detected UAS platforms.  An overview of the 
identification matrix is presented in Figure 2. Upon initial detection, the detection 
and engagement system operator would verify that the UAS operation was not an 
authorized operation by comparing the parameters against authorized flight plans 
and coordinated with authorized UAS pilots via WhatsApp.   
 
If the operation was determined to be unauthorized, the detection and 
engagement system operator reported the cardinal direction of the unknown UAS 
to the overwatch observer via Zello for visual confirmation and tracking. The 
mobile liaison was deployed via Zello in conjunction with an event security officer 
to locate the UAS and UAS operator, receiving supplemental location updates from 
the overwatch observer. Once the overwatch observer visually located the intruding 
UAS, he would determine if the craft was within the authorized engagement zone 
of 1 km from the event site.  Additionally, he would perform a visual risk 
assessment of the ground area below the UAS to determine if the device could be 
safely disabled without causing injury to people or damage to unprotected 
structures or property.  If the overwatch observer deemed the engagement safe, he 
would report his findings to the DESO.  The DESO would then coordinate with the 
IDAC or event Chief Security Officer on duty to obtain permission to electronically 
disable the intruding UAS. If approved, the mobile liaison and accompanying event 
security officer would proceed to the UAS location to investigate the crash site and 
secure the unmanned vehicle [if UAS discontinued flight], or follow the UAS back 
to its launch location [if the UAS returned-to-home].  If the pilot was located, the 
mobile liaison deferred further action to the event security officer, who had the 
discretion to arrange an arrest or expel the operator from the event.      
 
Engagement Results 
 
During the contract period, the IDS team detected 23 total UAS events in 
the exclusion area.  Of the 23 events, 15 were unauthorized.  Three unauthorized 
incursions occurred during daylight hours, one incursion occurred during local civil 
twilight, and 11 incursions occurred at night.  
 
The team responded to all 15 unauthorized events. The IDS team leveraged 
geofence notifications four times and employed countermeasures preventing or 
limiting exclusion zone incursions. Electronic counter-measures (ECM) 
interrupting pilot UAS control was employed during eight incursions. No action 
was taken during two of the events since the UAS crashed during one event, and 
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the UAS was unable to be visually located during the second. Event security was 
dispatched during one event, and an authorized pilot was erroneously detained, with 
the offending unauthorized pilot escaping backstage before security could 
intervene. Two unmanned aircraft were confiscated during the event.  The 
confiscated platforms were both DJI products and included Phantom and Mavic 
models.   
 
 
Figure 2. Intruder UAS identification and decision matrix. 
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Eight authorized UAS flights were conducted by two companies.  One 
authorized pilot was de-certified for flight after deviating from an established flight 
plan, failing to coordinate launch with IDS personnel, and performing a flight over 
the gathered crowd within the exclusion zone on November 3. An overview of 
incursion and countermeasure employment activity is contained in Figure 3.  
Details and engagement notes are contained in Appendix 1.  A visual depiction of 
a visually-spotted UAS are displayed in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
 
Figure 3. UAS activity locations, November 3-5, 2017.  (Google Maps/Satellite Overlay) 
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Figure 4.  Intruding, daylight UAS flight; spotter facing southeast. 
 
 
 
14
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 5 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol5/iss2/8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2018.1224
  
 
   
 
Figure 5.  Authorized nighttime UAS flight; spotter facing east-southeast. 
 
Discussion 
  
As evidenced by the multiple lessons learned, it is clear that the commercial 
counter-UAS field is still very much evolving to discover the best tactics, 
techniques, and procedures to employ against UAS threats.   
 
During this event, the IDS team solely employed an RF countermeasure 
system, which proved effective against the intruding, consumer-grade UAS 
platforms.  It is unknown based on the collected data how the RF countermeasure 
system would have fared against a homebuilt UAS.  In this particular case, it is 
highly likely that the preponderance of UAS intruders were hobbyists, interested in 
capturing video of the noted, national event.  Based on the reported UAS incidents, 
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it seems unlikely that any of the platforms were being used maliciously to carry out 
criminal activities or cause substantial harm.   
 
Describe counter-UAS mission planning considerations 
 
 The IDS team highlighted the importance of the mission planning process 
when preparing to conduct counter-UAS activities.  Based on the provided data, 
researchers suggest that the following considerations be taken into account when 
performing counter-UAS operations: 
 
Identify Mission Objectives: Determine primary mission objectives such as 
area or target to be protected, duration, and 
other requirements. 
Site Survey: 
 
Conduct site survey to determine likely areas 
of UAS launch, ingress, & egress routes.  
Correlate site locations with established 
NOTAMS/TFRs, etc. Determine areas where 
UAS-disabling mitigation strategies would be 
hazardous (areas of vehicular traffic, crowded 
areas, etc). 
Observation Point Selection: 
 
Determine areas of best visibility for UAS 
visual detection. Consider sun positioning, 
background contrast, and lighting.  Establish 
visual landmark references & determine the 
distance to aid in threat distance estimation and 
coordination.  
C-UAS Equipment Deployment: 
 
Determine line of sight for RF detection & 
interruption equipment.  Determine equipment 
deployment limitations, based on logistical 
requirements (availability of electricity, 
control cord length, communications coverage, 
etc.).  Identify likely coverage gaps based on 
equipment capabilities & effectiveness.    
Probable Threat Assessment & Taxonomy: 
 
Identify possible threat platforms based on 
probable threat intent (attack, video recording, 
hobbyist flight, etc), consumer availability, 
prior encounter experience, local knowledge, 
environmental favorability (i.e. open areas are 
favorable to fixed-wing UAS, whereas 
obstacle-dense areas are not).   
Risk Assessment/Risk Tolerance: 
 
Determine risk tolerance to protected target. 
Codify measurable criteria to determine risk 
elevation (standoff distance, UAS type, size, 
speed, etc).  Establish risk assessment matrix. 
Identification Matrix Development: 
 
Determine means to identify authorized vs. 
unauthorized UAS flights. Integrate elevated 
response matrix triggers based on risk 
tolerance and risk assessment. 
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Mitigation Selection: 
 
Determine primary (and if applicable) 
secondary or tertiary mitigation mechanisms 
for UAS threats.  Ensure appropriateness and 
effectiveness of mitigation strategies to 
anticipated threats.  Determine how the 
employment of various mitigations will be 
determined.  Determine engagement authority 
and coordination requirements, if required. 
Communications Plan: 
 
Identify communications requirements 
modalities and limitations.  Establish primary 
(and secondary) means of communication.  
Codify coordination plan for authorized UAS 
flights. Articulate communications purpose 
and information flow. (should be responsive to 
who, what, where, when why, how 
communication should occur)  
Coordination Plan: Identify how C-UAS activities integrate into 
overall security plan. Describe capabilities 
response plan to decision-making authorities 
and other stakeholders. Determine 
coordination requirements. 
Social Media & Public Information: 
 
Identify means of public information 
dissemination, including the applicability of 
TFRs, NOTAMS, etc. Identify how 
information will be disseminated and how 
communications modalities will be monitored 
and responsive to public inquiry. 
Figure 6. Proposed counter-UAS mission planning tasks.  The authors acknowledge that the 
planning task list does not address every conceivable task associated with counter-UAS operations, 
but rather captures and codifies key planning elements represented in the collected interview data.   
 
Identify key tasks associated with a counter-UAS engagement 
 
Based on perceptions provided by the research participants, the authors 
codified a proposed model for key tasks associated with counter-UAS engagement.  
This model contained in Figure 7 can be used by commercial counter-UAS 
organizations to facilitate threat mitigation in a concerted, safe, and systematic 
manner. 
 
Detection:    Detect unauthorized UAS operation. 
Track:   Fix location, speed, course, altitude and track visually or via other 
means. 
Threat Assessment: Confirm regulatory or airspace violation and threat potential of UAS 
system.  
Search: Conduct hasty search for UAS operator; if found, communicate 
requirement to disengage activities and land UAS. 
Identification:  Determine identification of brand/model of UAS [if possible]. 
Evaluate: Evaluate UAS brand/model vulnerabilities 
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Selection: Determine appropriate countermeasure/mitigation system to engage 
UAS. 
Situational Analysis: Evaluate situation and environment to determine hazards or potential 
collision effects of engagement. 
Risk Assessment: Determine risk level associated with performing an engagement. 
Balance engagement decision based on measured risk and likely 
collateral effects. 
Decision:  Make engagement decision. 
Engagement: Perform engagement. 
Effectiveness: Determine effectiveness of countermeasure/engagement strategy.  
Confirm if UAS threat has been neutralized or disabled. If ineffective, 
return to Evaluate step.  
Disengagement: Discontinue employment of countermeasure system.  
Locate: Locate UAS platform or wreckage. 
Examine: Examine UAS for collateral threats or effects (i.e. attached IED, 
CBRNE, HAZMAT, fire, etc). 
Respond: Respond to collateral threats or effects. 
Investigation: Collect applicable evidence, including scene photos, UAS identifying 
markings, testimony of witnesses or other relevant information. 
Secure: Secure the UAS platform, as appropriate. 
Enforce: Locate and report/coordinate detainment/citation/trespass offending 
individual, as appropriate. 
Document: Document threat, circumstances, engagement, results, and 
investigation findings. 
Report: File applicable reports with appropriate agency or jurisdictional 
authority. 
Reconstitute:  Reequip for subsequent response or engagement, as required. 
 
Figure 7. Proposed engagement model for counter-UAS actions.  Note: This recommended 
engagement matrix provides a holistic approach to counter-UAS response. This model represents a 
long-chain decision-making process whereby risk level is relatively low and the responders do not 
hold indigenous engagement authority.  The authors acknowledge that there may be good 
justification to hasten or even skip certain steps, based on situational conditions, the relative severity 
of the threat, and timeliness of response.    
 
 
Identify problems, unanticipated conditions, or lessons learned associated 
with counter-UAS operations 
 
The IDS team reported that access to reliable electrical power presented a 
challenge for the operation.  Intermittent power to the RF detectors/control signal 
interruption device caused significant damage to one of the four deployed devices, 
requiring equipment repair and replacement that could not be performed in the field.  
This setback required the IDS team to prioritize countermeasure coverage, focusing 
on vectors of likely UAS incursions.  The team stated that robust surge protectors 
will be included in their future deployment kit to prevent damage to sensitive 
computer and countermeasure equipment.  Moreover, the loss of equipment 
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underscores the importance of having reliable equipment redundancy or viable 
alternatives available. 
 
Additionally, interrupted or unreliable WI-FI coverage limited the team’s 
ability to perform digital updates to the RF detection/control system.  Additionally, 
the lack of reliable WI-FI coverage also forced the team to rely more heavily on 
cellular phone data for communications and other internet needs. The team plans to 
acquire alternative communication means that can serve as a backup in the event of 
limited or interrupted wireless internet connectivity.   
 
 The IDS over watch experienced intermittent difficulty visually locating 
UAS platforms—particularly at night.  See Figure 5.  During most night UAS 
encounters, UAS platforms were well illuminated by integrated position lighting, 
however, on at least one occasion these lights were intentionally obscured or 
disabled by the operator, likely to avoid visual detection.  As a result, the IDS team 
plans to acquire a monocular night vision device to aid the overwatch observer in 
spotting unlighted UAS craft.  Additionally, the team also plans to include 
traditional binoculars in its future deployment kit to augment daytime visual 
detection.  Moreover, there may be cause to suggest the need for additional 
manpower allocation to this critical function to put “more eyes on more sky.”     
 
During the event, the RF countermeasure device was accused of causing 
interference with the event’s ticket scanners. However, this interference was never 
validated.  The team suggested that in the future, further efforts will be given to 
identifying potential collateral EM spectrum interference problems.        
 
The team stated that additional onsite preparation time would have been 
helpful.  The team explained that further coordination with authorized pilots could 
have streamlined the flight authorization process. 
 
Finally, the team highlighted the importance and effectiveness of social 
media engagement.  The entertainment contractor’s prominent social media 
presence and advisory message postings advising UAS operators to remain clear of 
the venue played a significant role in deterring unauthorized UAS activity.    
 
Conclusions 
 
As the literature review suggests, unmanned threats are continuing to evolve 
in application, scope, and complexity.  In January 2018, the Russian military 
reported a swarm attack of crudely-designed, weaponized unmanned aircraft on two 
of its bases in Syria (Daniels, 2018).  Reportedly, Russian air defenses detected 13 
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“small size air targets” inbound to its bases and successfully engaged them with 
anti-aircraft and electronic-countermeasures (Daniels, 2018, p. 1).  As cited in 
Daniels (2018), political scientist and terrorism expert Colin Clarke underscored 
the attack as a wakeup call, urging: 
 
The U.S. and other nations have a lot of thinking to do about how to 
deal with the weaponized drone technology because it could be used 
not just on the battlefield but potentially in urban areas by organized 
terrorist groups and other bad actors (p. 1).   
 
The overall lack of available literature calls attention to the need to develop 
further and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures for countering UAS threats.  
The preponderance of unanticipated setbacks and lessons learned derived from the 
presented case study suggests that adequate best practices are still very much in the 
infancy of development.  The findings of this study should not be interpreted as 
conclusive, but rather as a basis of deviation for additional research, exploration, 
and discussion.   
 
Although not directly studied, participant comments suggested that existing 
legal and regulatory roadblocks preventing the use of active, counter-UAS 
mitigation measures in the U.S. may discourage counter-UAS development and 
place the country at a disadvantage in effecting UAS security.  While political 
leaders have made recent positive steps to rectify this deficiency through more 
permissible legislation, the remaining legal hurdles are likely to continue curtailing 
counter-UAS development.  
 
This research project codifies merely one approach to effecting counter-
UAS operations.   No doubt, there are many more viable and perhaps more effective 
means of mitigating unmanned aircraft threats.  Perhaps the most important 
conclusion that can be gleaned from this study is the glaring need for additional 
research in this highly fluid, evolving field.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 5 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol5/iss2/8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2018.1224
  
 
   
References 
 
Abbasi, W. (2017). Inmates fly mobile phones, drugs and porn into jail – via  
drone. USA Today. Retrieved from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
2017/06/15/inmates-increasingly-look-drones-smuggle-contraband-into-
their-cells/102864854/ 
 
Bolster, K. & Rivera, R. (2017). Prison employee fired after inmate escapes from  
Lieber Correctional. WSMV. Retrieved from http://www.wsmv.com/story/ 
35816591/scinmate-captured-in-texas-with-guns-cash-phones-drone-may-
have-aided-escape 
 
Carey, B. (2016). FAA will evaluate ‘Counter-UAS’ technology at Denver  
Airport. AIN Online. Retrieved from https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-
news/aerospace/2016-11-09/faa-will-evaluate-counter-uas-technology-
denver-airport 
 
Craig, T.R., Russo, J. & Shaffer, J.S. (2016). Eyes in the skies: the latest threat to  
correctional institution security. Corrections Today. Retrieved from 
https://www.justnet.org/pdf/Craig-Russo-Shaffer.pdf 
 
Creswell, J. W., & Miller, D. L. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative  
inquiry. Theory into Practice, 39(3), 124. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/218779
368?accountid=27203 
 
Daniels, J. (2018). Russia says it killed rebels behind swarm drone attack in Syria,  
but experts see more such strikes ahead. CNBC News. Retrieved from 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/12/russia-says-it-eliminated-rebels-
behind-swarm-drone-attack-in-syria.html 
 
Dinan, S. (2018). Thirteen drones in four days: How drug smugglers are using  
technology to beat Border Patrol. Washington Times. Retrieved from 
https://m.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/2/drones-fly-drugs-us-no-
border-patrol-detection-tec/ 
 
FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615  
codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101 
 
 
 
21
Wallace et al.: Exploring Commercial Counter-UAS Operations: A Case Study
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018
  
 
   
Federal Aviation Administration. (2016). Focus area Pathfinder Program.  
Retrieved from https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/ 
focus_area_pathfinder/ 
 
Gettinger, D. & Michel, A.H. (2015). Drone sightings and close encounters: An  
analysis. Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College. Retrieved 
from http://dronecenter.bard.edu/drone-sightings-and-close-encounters/ 
 
Gomez, M. & Salonga, R. (2017). Man suspected of flying drone over 49ers,  
 Raiders games arrested. Security Info Watch. Retrieved from 
 http://www.securityinfowatch.com/news/12383982/man-suspected-of-
 flying-drone-over-49ers-raiders-games-arrested 
 
Larls, M. (2017). John Taylor fought the FAA over registering drones and won, 
but now what. Washington Post. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/john-
taylorfought-the-faa-over-registering-drones-and-won-but-now-
what/2017/05/29/56b83bf8-416a-11e7-adba394ee67a7582_ 
story.html?utm_term=.6e4b6090ca17 
 
Michel, A.H. & Gettinger, D. (2016). Analysis of new drone incident reports.  
Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College. Retrieved from 
http://dronecenter.bard.edu/analysis-3-25-faa-incidents/ 
 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000. 
 
Rattigan, K. (2017). DOJ reports on drones flying contraband to prisons. Data  
Privacy & Security Insider. Retrieved from 
https://www.dataprivacyandsecurityinsider.com/2017/06/doj-reports-on-
drones-flying-contraband-to-prisons/ 
 
Rupprecht, J. (2017). 7 big problems with counter-drone technology (drone  
 jammers, anti-drone guns, etc.). Rupprecht Law. Retrieved from 
 https://jrupprechtlaw.com/drone-jammer-gun-defender-legal-problems 
 
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2016). 
 
Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 14 C.F.R. § 101E (2016).  
 
 
 
22
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 5 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol5/iss2/8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2018.1224
  
 
   
Valencia, N. & Martinez, M. (2015). Drone carrying drugs crashes south of U.S.  
border. CNN. Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/22/world/ 
drug-drone-crashes-us-mexico-border/ 
 
Wallace, R.J. & Loffi, J.M. (2015). Examining unmanned aerial system threats &  
defenses: A conceptual analysis. International Journal of Aviation, 
Aeronautics, and Aerospace, 2(4). Retrieved from https://doi.org/ 
10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1084 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23
Wallace et al.: Exploring Commercial Counter-UAS Operations: A Case Study
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018
  
 
   
Appendix 1 
 
Summary of UAS Activity, Response, & Disposition 
 
 
DTG 
 
Status 
 
Response 
 
Disposition 
 
 
031755 
 
 
Unauthorized 
 
None 
 
UAS detected & crashed 
032020 
 
Authorized None N/A 
032049 Authorized Pilot Grounded Authorized pilot deviation from 
flight plan 
032154 Unauthorized Geofence Unable to employ countermeasures 
due to crowd proximity; performed 
GPS Jamming; UAS RTH; Tracked 
back to operator 
032256 Unauthorized ECM UAS landed 200’ outside stadium; 
Notified security 
030022  Unauthorized Geofence UAS RTH; operator located outside 
perimeter 
030216 
 
Unauthorized Geofence UAS RTH 
041211 
 
Unauthorized None UAS detected; unable to rectify 
041755 
 
Authorized None TV UAS crew; duration 15 mins 
041939 
 
Authorized None TV UAS crew; duration 10 mins 
041952 Unauthorized ECM UAS detected; no visual contact; 
Presumed unable to initiate launch 
042005 Unauthorized ECM UAS detected; visually spotted 
flying low over crowd; ECM 
initiated; landed 1800’ west of 
stadium 
042012 Unauthorized ECM UAS detected; visually spotted high 
altitude flight pattern; ECM 
initiated; RTH westbound 
042016 Unauthorized ECM UAS detected; visually spotted UAS 
launch from VIP tower; descended 
near stage; UAS secured by spotter/ 
ID’d operator; referred to security 
042053 
 
Authorized None TV UAS crew; duration 11 mins 
042122 
 
Authorized None TV UAS crew 
042145 
 
Authorized None TV UAS crew 
042212 Authorized None TV UAS crew 
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DTG 
 
Status 
 
Response 
 
Disposition 
 
 
042237 
 
Authorized None TV UAS crew 
042348 
 
Authorized None TV UAS crew 
051656 
 
Authorized None TV UAS crew; duration 28 mins 
051744 Unauthorized ECM UAS detected; visually spotted 2 mi 
east of stadium; ECM initiated; 
uncontrolled descent; security 
unable to locate 
051808 Unauthorized ECM UAS visually spotted 1 mi west of 
backstage; ECM initiated; UAS 
crash landed outside perimeter 
051927 
 
Authorized None TV UAS crew; duration 16 mins 
051959 Unauthorized Geofence 4x UAS detected; UAS platforms 
RTH 
052112 
 
Authorized None TV UAS crew 
052322 Unauthorized ECM UAS spotted by TV crew; authorized 
UAS landed; ECM initiated; landed 
outside northeast stadium  
052328 Unauthorized Security 
dispatched 
Erroneously detained authorized 
UAS operator; unauthorized 
operator recovered downed UAS and 
escaped backstage  
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